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This paper compares and contrasts the United States federal Empowerment Zone and 
European Union Objective 2 programs that geographically target economic 
revitalization incentives.  Since 1989, both programs have designated predominately 
industrial or urban areas as being distressed and worthy of government incentives in 
three separate rounds.  The paper uses a probit econometric model to comparatively 
evaluate the characteristics of the areas that were targeted.  The paper finds that while 
the programs were fashioned for different reasons and thus had different goals, the 
programs on both continents initially targeted very distressed areas.  However, 
consistent with the fears of critics of spatial targeting, subsequent rounds of designation 
greatly expanded the programs, and in most cases, lead to less precise targeting. 
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I.  Introduction 
In recent years on both sides of the Atlantic, there has been a renewed interest in the 
spatial targeting of economic revitalization incentives at the national and supranational 
levels.  After a decade and a half of experimentation with state-sponsored enterprise 
zone programs, the United States first began designating the federal Empowerment 
Zones (EZs) in 1994 in order to promote local economic revitalization of impoverished, 
predominantly urban, areas on a much larger scale and with much bigger resources than 
the state programs.  Through three rounds of designation, the federal program has 
already targeted parts of 31 economically distressed metropolitan areas with EZ 
incentives.
1  Over the last decade in the European Union, regional programs co-financed 
through the Structural Funds
2 have become a popular economic revitalization tool for 
EU regions (Objective 2 areas) with declining industrial production.  To date, economic 
revitalization packages have been offered in three separate rounds to more than 80 
Objective 2 (Ob.2) areas located in twelve EU countries covering approximately 18% of 
the EU population. 
There are several economic justifications for geographically targeting policy rather 
than offering incentives more globally.  A number of negative externalities may be 
created if the geographic location of economic development is left to be determined by 
market forces alone (e.g., Ladd, 1994; Bartik, 2000).  One of such negative externalities 
is an excessive increase of urban sprawl if decaying inner city districts are not 
recuperated as vital economic and/or residential places.  In addition, increased pollution 
and traffic congestion can occur if economic development does not occur uniformly 
with a balanced exploiting of metro and non-metro lands.  Further, increased criminal 
activity can result if abandoned industrial and/or residential inner city areas are left in 
their decaying state instead of being properly rehabilitated.  Labor market are often 
inefficient and do not adjust quickly to changes in economic opportunities.  Resources 
are thus under-utilized in high unemployment inner-city areas because of people’s 
inability or unwillingness to move from those areas. 
In light of such arguments, some have stressed in the economic development 
literature the importance of targeting the most needy places (e.g., Bartik, 1994, Sridhar, 
2001).  If non-needy places are targeted, the programs do not meet this economic 
                                                 
1 The federal program also includes 10 rural EZs, 105 urban and rural Enterprise Communities (ECs) that 
receive less generous incentives, and 40 urban and rural Renewal Communities (RCs). 
2 Funding is primarily through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and secondarily 




rationale and risk distorting markets and creating inefficiencies.  Critics of these 
programs have argued that even if spatial targeting may be justified to help correct 
market failures, political factors often hinder effective implementation.  In the past, 
geographically targeted revitalization programs have often grown rapidly and ultimately 
included too many areas for the intervention, thus loosing the critical focus on only 
needy places (Rhoads, 1985; Lehman, 1994). 
Given the increasing popularity of such programs and the tremendous amount of 
resources devoted to them, it is important to examine how they are performing.  A 
stream of impact evaluation literature has recently emerged to complement the previous 
case studies and surveys examining US state enterprise zones (e.g., Papke, 1994; 
Boarnet and Bogart, 1996; Dowall, 1996; Engberg and Greenbaum; 1999; Bondonio 
and Engberg, 2000; Greenbaum and Engberg, 2000; Bondonio, 2002a; Peters and 
Fisher, 2002).  The national programs have been studies less, with an initial look at 
Empowerment Zones funded by the US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (Herbert, 2001) and the first econometric impact evaluation for the EU 
Ob.2-area programs (Bondonio, 2002b).  In such studies, the analysis is focused on 
measuring the net impact on employment, business or housing market outcomes of the 
program incentives net of influences from exogenous economic factors.  This study 
focus instead in analyzing jointly for the US and the EU the policy outcomes in term of 
actual target area selection.  Thus, the analysis goes to the very heart of the policy issue:  
is the program implementation consistent with sound economic rationale that implies 
limiting target places to only severely distressed places? 
This paper compares and contrasts the US and EU processes of geographically 
targeting economic revitalization incentives and examines the types of places that have 
emerged as the outcome of the targeting process.  Within the EU, the case of Italy is 
also examined to provide more detailed analysis.  The paper finds that the US federal 
EZs and the EU Ob.2-area programs target different types of places, which is consistent 
with their  different program goals.  However,  the paper finds evidence of a common 
trend in both programs to expand the geographic coverage over time.  The worst-off 
places were often initially targeted and subsequent enlargement extended to more 
moderately distressed areas.  The exception was Italy, where they latest expansion 
continued to target very distressed areas. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides information 




the data used in the analysis and presents descriptive statistics that help distinguish the 
programs across the different implementation rounds.  Section IV presents the empirical 
probit regression model and results.  Section V closes the paper with concluding 
remarks.  
 
II.  US and EU program background 
While the US experimented sporadically with programs targeted at particular 
impoverished areas in the past, geographically targeted economic revitalization 
programs began to be widely implemented in the early 1980s, when individual states 
started designating enterprise zone programs based upon the British program of the 
same name.  While the UK programs focused on abandoned industrial sites, the US 
programs have always had more of a community development goal.  To date, over 40 
states have passed some type of enterprise zone program, which generally offer 
packages of tax abatements and capital and labor incentives to areas that meet distress 
criteria.  These criteria typically include factors such as high unemployment and 
poverty, disadvantaged residents, population loss, and poor infrastructure.  Sound 
empirical evaluations (based on outcome data from US Census Bureau data) of these 
state programs have come to mixed, although generally rather negative conclusions 
about that effectiveness of the programs (see, for example, Papke, 1993; Papke, 1994; 
Boarnet and Bogart, 1996; Fisher and Peters, 1997; Fisher and Peters, 1998; Engberg 
and Greenbaum, 1999; Bondonio, 2000; Bondonio and Engberg, 2000; Greenbaum and 
Engberg, 2000; Peters and Fisher, 2002). 
Perhaps some of the lack of measured success of the state programs has been due to 
the scale of the programs—the incentives may have been not large enough relative to 
the costs of doing business in very distressed areas.  Partially to address this, the US 
federal government began implementing zones in 1994 called Empowerment Zones and 
Enterprise Communities (EZ/EC) as part of the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.  
These zones were on a much larger scale than the state programs and subsequently came 
with much larger incentives.  The number of zones was expanded in two additional 
rounds in 1998 and 2001.  The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 that 
authorized the third round of programs added a third type of zone, Renewal 
Communities, and also extended the tax incentives from the first two rounds until 




are smaller in number and offer greater financial incentives than the Enterprise 
Communities.  Renewal Communities have only been in existence since 2001. 
In order to be designated as an EZ, communities had to met certain distress and size 
criteria.  Although no standard application form was required, they had also to create 
and submit a zone strategic plan providing evidence of broad and active community 
participation in the proposed revitalization efforts.  Formal minimal distress criteria in 
the first round legislation included thresholds of poverty and unemployment.  The 
Round 2 legislation relaxed some of the minimal distress criteria by authorizing the 
elimination of a rule limiting at least half of the area to contain census tracts with 
poverty rates of at least 35 percent (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 2001b).  In addition, Round 2 legislation exempted from the poverty rate 
criteria up to three sites suitable for development containing less than a combined 2000 
acres.  The Round 3 legislation provided the same designation criteria as Round 2. 
 
Table 1 lists the communities that received urban EZs during the three rounds of 
designation.  The dates in the table refer to the year in which the zones were designated 
rather than the year the legislation was passed.  Eight cities were awarded urban EZs in 
Round 1.
3  The second designation Round added 15 more target communities 
containing empowerment zones, while eight additional target communities were 
designated in Round 3.  All of the urban EZs except for Atlanta’s
4 remained active 
through the subsequent designation rounds, so 30 target communities remain active 
EZs. 
The incentive package offered to EZ communities through the three designation 
rounds is mainly composed as follows: A) employment credits of up to $3000 per 
employee per year for zone businesses to hire or train local residents; B) increased tax 
deductions for depreciable properties, such as equipment and machineries, acquired by 
zone businesses
5; C) tax exempt bond financing; D) Economic Development Initiative 
(EDI) grants to promote broad economic revitalization initiatives; E) special 
considerations and priority for a number of federal community assistance programs; F) 
                                                 
3 Technically, only six cities were initially awarded EZs.  Los Angeles and Cleveland were given 
“Supplemental Empowerment Zones” that were later converted to full Empowerment Zones by the Round 
2 legislation.  Because these two geographic areas were nevertheless selected in the first round, they are 
considered to be Round 1 EZs for the purpose of this analysis. 
4 Atlanta was designated an EZ in Round 1 that was replaced by a Renewal Community in Round 3. 
5 Increased deductions are in the amount of $20,000 ($35,000 for properties acquired after December 31, 
2001). The total deduction limit was in 1997, for example, $38,000 for EZ firms and $18,000 for other 




$100 million social-service block grants (for Round 1 EZs only) usable for a variety of 
public and private community activities within the strategic plan programming for the 
zone
6 (Cuomo, 1995; Wolf, 1995; Berger, 1997; Sweet, 1999; U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, 2001a; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 2001b; Herbert, 2001).   
In Europe, spatially targeted development has taken on a more regional focus.  As 
nations began to attempt to coordinate national economies into what is now the 
European Union, it was realized early on that aid needed to be targeted to the most 
severely distressed regions in order to reduce regional disparities.  While the 1957 
Treaty of Rome pointed out this need, little was provided in the way of specific 
programs.  The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), established in 1975, 
began to implement programs to attempt to shrink regional inequities (Sweet, 1999).  
However, it was not until 1989 that the Structural Funds,
7 which seek to promote 
economic and social cohesion among all nations member of Union, were reformed to 
specifically target distressed areas in an attempt to redistribute economic activity to 
those areas.  
Objective 2 (Ob.2) of the Structural Funds provides ERDF assistance to areas of 
high unemployment and declining industrial production.  Ob.2 programs are named 
after one of the objective propositions (seven in all for the 1989-93 and 1994-1999 
programming periods; three for the 2000-06 period) set to discipline and coordinate all 
of the initiatives co-funded by the EU structural funds.  While some of the other 
objectives that focus on the economic adjustment of poor regions are spatially targeted, 
others that focus on agriculture and the economic integration and training of youth and 
the long-term unemployed are not. 
To date, as with the US federal programs, EU Ob.2 programs have been 
implemented over three programming periods: 1989-1993 (Round 1 programs); 1994-
1999 (Round 2 programs); 2000-2006 (Round 3 programs).  In the 1989-99 
programming periods, the Ob.2 proposition concerned solely promoting economic 
                                                 
6 Round 2 EZs received grants that were subject to annual appropriation, and Round 3 EZs did not receive 
grant funding. 
7 In addition to the ERDF (set for funding predominantly geographically-targeted economic 
revitalization/development programs), other EU structural funds include:  the European Social Fund (set 
mainly for financing active labor policies and/or job training programs); the European Agriculture 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (devoted to rural development and adjustment of agricultural structures), 





revitalization of industrially declining regions in the EU member nations.  In the current 
2000-06 period, instead, the new Ob.2 proposition also embraces boosting development 
of rural and exclusively urban areas.
8 
For the 1989-99 programming periods, eligible areas for Ob.2 programs had to meet 
three specific distress criteria:  unemployment rate exceeding the EU average for the 
last three years prior to the beginning of each programming period (i.e., 1989 and 
1994); share of industrial unemployment exceeding the EU average in any year after 
1975; overall decline in industrial employment since 1975.  The current 2000-06 
programming period simplified and reduced the number of objectives, thus resulting in 
an expanded definition of Ob.2 areas.  Eligible areas for Ob.2 programs can now be of 
four types: areas with declining industrial production and employment whose eligibility 
criteria are identical to those of the earliest programming periods; rural areas with low 
population density, high rate of agricultural employment or declining employment; 
urban areas with severely distressed housing and socio-economic conditions; areas with 
a substantial percentage of population employment in the fishing industry and a 
concurrent reduction in the fishing industry employment
9. 
Table 2 lists the 12 EU countries in which Ob.2 areas are designated.  The rows 
under each country name lists the NUTS_1 areas
10 that received an Ob.2 program 
during at least one of the three rounds of the programs.
11  In the columns next to each 
NUTS_1 area contain “Xs” that indicate whether the presence of an Ob.2 program in 
that round of programming.  Austria, Finland, and Sweden did not join the EU until 
1995, so they received Ob.2 programs only when they joined the EU during the second 
round. 
Incentives offered by Ob.2 programs focus on the general economy of the target 
areas, employment, local development, and technological improvement.  The programs 
are tailored to the needs of the individual Ob. 2 regions.  General economy incentives 
include support for restructuring, conversion and modernization; revitalization and 
                                                 
8 Information on the 2000-06 EU Ob.2 programming round can be found at. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/objective2/areas_en.htm. 
9 Information on EU Ob.2 policies and eligibility criteria for the current 2000-06 programming period can 
be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/objective2/prog_en.htm. 
10 NUTS stands for Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics.  As described in section III of the 
paper, it is the five-tier hierarchical regional structure used to standardize the economic territories of 
European Union member states.  NUTS_1 areas are the largest units of the hierarchical structure, formed 
by very few large subsets of member countries. 
11 Objective 2 areas are much smaller than NUTS_1 areas, but a table listing the presence of Objective 2 
areas at a smaller geographic level would be many pages long.  A similar table of Objective 2 areas at  




economic diversification; development and internationalization of business activities; 
investments for industry, innovation and activity start-up; and support for small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs).  Employment incentives include specific support for 
employment growth; human resources development; and technical and vocational 
worker training. Local development measures include exploiting the region’s potential; 
support for tourism and services; infrastructure support; environmental protection and 
improvement; urban and industrial site regeneration; and investment attraction.   
Technology policies include R&D projects and know-how development; support for 
innovation transfer; and development of business and technology parks. 
 
III.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
US Empowerment Zones 
Empowerment Zones (EZs) are defined at the census tract, and EZ tract boundaries 
were taken from the HUD website
12 and supplemented and verified with maps from 
HUD’s “Research Maps (R-MAPS)” CD-ROM (Vol. 3).  The socio-economic and 
housing data used to distinguish EZ tracts from non-EZ tracts come from the 1990 
decennial census as compiled in HUD’s “Research Maps (R-MAPS)” CD-ROM (Vol. 
2).    
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics from 1990 for 44,012 urban census tracts in 
the United States.  While ten rural Empowerment Zones and numerous rural Enterprise 
Communities, Champion Communities and Rural Economic Area Partnership Zones 
have been designated during the three rounds, these programs generally encompass a 
much larger geographic area and contain many fewer residents than do the urban 
programs.  15,063 tracts were excluded because they were considered to be rural by 
virtue of not belonging to an urbanized area as defined by the US Census Bureau or by 
not being part of a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as defined by the US Office of 
Management and Budget.  A further 1238 tracts were excluded because they were 
designated as an urban Enterprise Community or urban Renewal Community.  While 
these tracts were not designated as Empowerment Zones, they were designated as 
distressed and given federal development incentives.  Thus, it would not be accurate to 
treat these tracts as non-EZ in a comparison of designated and not-designated areas. 
                                                 




The “No EZ” column of Table 3 contains 43,291 urban tracts that did not receive 
federal spatially targeted development incentives during any of rounds of the program.  
The “EZ” column contains the 721 tracts that were designated as an Empowerment 
Zone during any of the three rounds.  Differences in the zone and non-zone 
characteristics
13 are all highly significant (|P-values| all < .0001).  EZ tracts have a 
lower mean population (2827 versus 4362) than non-EZ tracts, but they also have much 
smaller land area so the average EZ tract is twice as densely populated (5367 versus 
2477 people/km
2).  Not surprisingly, EZ tracts were much more distressed in 1990 than 
the tracts not designated.  The unemployment rate was three times as high (19.7% 
versus 6.5%), the poverty rate was almost four times as high (44.4% versus 12.2%), and 
median household income was slightly more than a third of that in non-EZ tracts 
($12,783 versus $33,807).  There were three times as many minority residents (79.5% 
versus 25.3%) and many fewer high school graduates in EZ tracts on average (43.8% 
versus 75.5%).  In addition, rents were lower ($317 versus $502), housing prices were 
less than half ($44,115 versus $111,007) and owner occupancy rates were much lower 
(26.7% versus 61.8%) on average in zone tracts. 
The final three columns of Table 3 break the EZ tracts into the three rounds in which 
they were designated.  To test the means, an F-test was estimated to compare the 
variances of observations from Round 1 and rounds two and three.  In cases in which 
the null hypothesis of equal variances could be rejected at the .05 level, a t-test 
assuming unequal variances was used.  Otherwise, a t-test assuming equal variances was 
utilized.  By every measure, the 348 tracts initially designated in the first round in 1994 
were more distressed based on the 1990 data then the 249 tracts subsequently 
designated in 1999 in Round 2.  Further, except for median household income and 
median house value, the tracts initially designated in Round 1 were also significantly 
more distressed based on the 1990 census data than the 124 tracts subsequently 
designated in 2001 in Round 3.  Clearly, the most distressed tracts were initially 
designated EZs.  This finding is partially mitigated by the fact that 645 tracts that were 
designated as Renewal Communities (not shown in the table) in 2001 had 1990 
characteristics that were similar to the Round 1 Empowerment Zones. 
                                                 




European Union Objective 2 Areas 
European Union Objective 2 (Ob.2) areas are designated as groups of contiguous 
city or town jurisdictions of sizes considerably larger than the US Empowerment Zones.  
European Union data are standardized into a five-tier hierarchical structure of uniformly 
defined levels of geographic units referred to as Nomenclature of Units for Territorial 
Statistics (NUTS) areas.  NUTS_1 areas are the set of geographic statistical units 
formed by very few large subsets of member countries (composed as groups of 
contiguous regions or states corresponding to the largest sub-national jurisdictions for 
each member nation).  NUTS_3 areas are the set of geographic units formed by single 
second-tier sub-national jurisdictions (comparable in many aspects to US counties) of 
member nations, while NUTS_5 are the set of city or town jurisdictions of member 
nations (representing the smallest geographic units of the EU statistical systems).  To 
precisely measure socio-economic characteristics of the EU Ob.2 areas, aggregating 
together data from the appropriate NUTS_5s would be needed to avoid the non-exact 
correspondence between Ob.2 areas and the largest geographic units of the EU 
statistical systems (NUTS_3 or NUTS_1).  Unfortunately, unlike in the US, data on 
small geographic units such as NUTS_5 are not uniformly measured and processed 
throughout the EU.  One of the main reasons for the lack of data at fine geographic 
levels is the frequent changing of city or town (NUTS_5) boundaries.   
While a great deal of data is available from the European Union’s statistical agency, 
Eurostat, at the NUTS_1 or NUTS_2 level across the EU (European Commission, 
2001), that level of aggregation does not allow for very meaningful comparisons.  A 
much smaller subset of socio-economic variables useful for describing the 
characteristics of Ob.2 areas is available at the NUTS_3 level, which is still a rather 
coarse geographic measure.  More desirable NUTS_5 data are not available on an EU-
wide basis and thus cannot be used for cross country comparisons.  NUTS_5 data are 
available from other country-specific sources for a limited number of EU countries, and 
this study utilizes data from Italy that come from two sources:  Geostat (ISTAT, ESRI 
ITALIA, SEAT, 1997) and Sistema Starter (Istituto Tagliacarne, 1990). 
To determine how much of the NUTS_3 areas were designated as Ob.2 areas in the 




European Community, 1994) and the European Union web-site
14 were used to compare 
lists of Ob.2 areas with a map of NUTS_3 areas from the European Union
15. 
Table 4a presents descriptive statistics from 1990 for 483 NUTS_3 areas for eight 
EU countries.  Data from Austria, Finland, and Sweden are excluded because they were 
not EU members yet during Round 1.  The United Kingdom was excluded because there 
was a reorganization of local governments during the 1995 to 1998 period, and for 
many of the administrative units, NUTS_3 data do not exist prior to 1995.  Data for all 
the countries for the last two rounds are presented in Table 4b.  Prior to Round 3, Ob.2 
areas were restricted to urban areas and certain areas near Objective 1 areas (which are 
areas designated for EU assistance by virtue of severe and permanent distress socio-
economic conditions).  Because the program was expanded in 2000 to also cover rural 
and fishery areas, the analysis was restricted to only non-rural and non-fishery Ob.2 
areas to enable fair comparisons among the three rounds.   
The “Non Ob. 2” column of Table 4a contains summary statistics from 279 
NUTS_3 areas that did not receive Ob.2 incentives or any other EU-sponsored 
geography-based assistance programs.  The “Ob. 2” column contains statistics from 204 
NUTS_3 areas that partially or completely became Ob.2 areas during any of the three 
rounds.  On average, Ob.2 areas had double the population (420 thousand versus 216 
thousand) and double the unemployment rate (7.3 percent versus 4.1 percent) than 
“Non-Ob.2” areas.  The difference in population density was not significant at the 0.1 
level.  The remaining three columns of the table break the NUTS_3 areas into the three 
rounds in which they were designated.  The program expanded over time from 63 
NUTS_3 areas in Round 1 to 95 in Round 2 and 190 in Round 3.  Appropriate t-tests of 
test whether variable means of Ob.2 areas differ in Rounds 2 and 3 from Round 1.  Only 
the unemployment rate significantly differed (9.1 percent in Round 1, 8.3 percent in 
Round 2, and 7.3 percent in Round 3).  As with the US Empowerment Zones, the areas 
designated in the initial round were the most distressed. 
Table 4b presents the same descriptive statistics for rounds two and three for 619 
NUTS_3 areas in all 12 countries that received Ob.2 areas.  161 rural and fishery and 
307 Objective 1 NUTS_3 areas were excluded from the analysis.  The descriptive 
statistics are similar to those with the more limited number of countries.  As the first 







two columns of the table indicate, the 290 NUTS_3 Ob.2 areas had a higher average 
population (446 thousand versus 256 thousand) and higher unemployment rate (8.9 
percent versus 6.1 percent) than the 329 NUTS_3 areas without a program.  The final 
two columns compare the means between Round 2 and Round 3.  The 157 Round 1 
Ob.2 areas had a significantly higher unemployment rate (10 percent versus 8.9 percent) 
than the 275 Round 3 Ob.2 areas.  
 
Objective 2 Areas in Italy 
Availability of city-level data (i.e., NUTS_5 geographic units) for Italy allows the 
robustness of the analysis to be checked by eliminating the non-perfect correspondence 
between geographic units of the statistical systems and actual Ob.2 areas (as all Ob.2 
areas are designated as groups of cities -NUTS_5 units).  Replicating the analysis with 
only Italian data also allows housing variables and 1981-91 job growth trends to be 
included in the analysis.  
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics from 1991 for 5340 NUTS_5 areas.  As in 
Table 4a and Table 4b, the “Non Ob.2” column of Table 5 contains data from the 
NUTS_5 areas that did not receive Ob.2 incentives or any other form of EU-sponsored 
assistance, while the “Ob.2” column contains data from the NUTS_5 areas that became 
Ob.2 areas in any of the designation rounds.  All of the 1492 Ob.2 and the 3858 non-
Ob.2 NUTS_5s included in Table 5 are city or town jurisdictions located only in 
northern and central Italy, as southern Italy was entirely designated for EU assistance 
under the Ob.1 provision that targeted the most severely and permanently distressed 
regions of the EU member nations.  As with EZs and Ob.2 areas throughout the EU, 
differences in the Ob.2 and non-Ob.2 characteristics are all highly significant.  As 
expected, Italian Ob.2 areas show a higher mean unemployment rate (5.3 percent versus 
4.5 percent), a lower 1981-91 ten-year job growth (1.6 percent versus 6.6 percent) and a 
greater percentage of vacant houses (8.1 percent versus 7.1 percent) than non Ob.2 area.  
Contrary to the US EZs, less densely populated areas were targeted for Ob.2 assistance 
(194 versus 294 people per km
2).  Somewhat surprising since Ob. 2 programs focus on 
industrial areas, the percentage of manufacturing employees was lower (31.4 percent 
versus 37.1 percent) and the percentage of university graduates was slightly higher (4.5 
percent versus 4.1 percent) in the Ob.2 areas than in the non-Ob.2 areas. 
Comparisons among characteristics of Ob.2 areas designated in the three 




areas over the tree rounds, from 576 NUTS_5 areas in Round 1 to 675 in Round 2 to 
827 in Round 3.  Compared to Round 1 Ob.2 places, the characteristics of Round 2 
places were similar, with the only significant differences at the 0.5 level being that 
population density was much greater in Round 2 (306 versus 230 people per km
2), the 
percentage of manufacturing employees was higher in Round 2 (36 percent versus 33.5 
percent), and the percentage of vacant houses was lower in Round 2 (7.0 percent versus 
7.7 percent).  At the 0.1 level, the mean unemployment level was significantly lower in 
Round 2 (5.3 percent compared to 5.5 percent). 
  Round 3 Ob. 2 areas look very different from both Round 1 and Round 2 areas.  
All of the characteristics means were significantly different at the 0.1 level between 
Round 1 and Round 3.  Unlike the trend in the US and the EU as a whole, Round 3 
areas appeared to be worse off in many ways than the Round 1 areas.  Although Round 
3 places were less densely populated (135.6 versus 230 people per km
2) and had a 
slightly lower unemployment rate (5.2 percent versus 5.5 percent), Round 3 places had a 
lower percentage of manufacturing employees (27.9 percent versus 33.5 percent), lower 
1981-1991 job growth rate (0.9 percent versus 2.9 percent), more vacant houses (8.6 
percent versus 7.7 percent) and fewer university graduates (4.2 percent versus 4.8 
percent). 
In both the US and the EU, the programs appeared to have initially “hit” their 
targets.  Areas designated for assistance were generally much more distressed than those 
that were not.  However, in both cases the programs expanded to cover more and more 
“distressed” areas over time.  For both the US and for the EU as a whole at the highly 
aggregated NUTS_3 level, areas initially targeted were more distressed than areas 
subsequently targeted.  Italy, measured at a more disaggregated level, was an exception.  
The paper next examines whether these trends persist in a multivariate analysis of the 
factors that are likely to predict whether a particular geographic area is designated an 
EZ or Ob. 2 area. 
  
IV.  Regression analysis 
The basic model is a probit regression model that estimates the probability that 
tract or NUTS region i will be designated an Empowerment Zone or Ob.2 area as a 
function of the tract’s or NUTS region’s pre-designation characteristics (Xi),  




where T is the treatment area. 
The model in Equation (1) is then re-estimated for each round of the program: 
), ( ) 1 Pr( β i i
R X T Φ = =    (2) 
where R is the round and equals one, two, or three.  For the US, estimation of the 
probability of designation in Rounds 2 and 3 excludes tracts that were designated in 
previous rounds since those tracts were not candidates for further designation.  For the 
EU, each successive program replaced the previous one, so estimation in Rounds 2 and 
3 includes all NUTS regions.  As before, urban areas that receive other similar types of 
geographic targeting are excluded, as are rural programs.  Thus, in the EU, Objective 1 
NUTS areas are excluded. 
 
US Empowerment Zone regression results 
Table 6 presents the results of estimating Equations 1 and 2 for the US.  The “All 
EZ” column contains the probit estimation of Equation 1, the probability of 
Empowerment Zone designation in any of the three rounds.  All of the coefficients are 
significant at the 0.1 level, which is not surprising considering the large number of 
observations (44,012).  Consistent with the means presented in Table 3, the regression 
results indicate that tracts with lower population, higher unemployment rates, greater 
poverty rates, lower median household income, greater minority population, fewer high 
school graduates, lower median house value and lower fraction of owner occupied 
housing were more likely to be designated Empowerment Zones.  Controlling for all of 
the other factors, tracts with higher median rents and lower population density were 
more likely to be designated as EZs.  These two coefficient estimates differ from the 
implications from the descriptive statistics, but are not surprising give that they are 
interpreted as marginal changes holding the other variables constant and given that 
many of the variables are moderately correlated with one another. 
The final three columns in Table 6 provide the results of estimating Equation 2 for 
each of the three rounds of Empowerment Zones.  For the estimates of the probability of 
becoming an EZ in the first round of designation, many of the same patterns hold.  The 
model is a better fit than Equation 1 as measured by a pseudo R
2 (0.449 versus 0.404) or 
by the log likelihood (-1118.9 versus –2192.5).  Most of the coefficients are still 
significant and larger for predicting first round EZs than for predicting EZs of any 




significant.  The other exception is that the population density coefficient (0.008) is 
positive and significant at the 0.01 level for the first round EZs compared to the 
negative coefficient for all rounds (-0.006). 
When estimating the probability of a second round EZ, the coefficients on the 
unemployment rate, high school graduation rate, and median house value are no longer 
significant at the 0.1 percent level, while the coefficient on the poverty rate (0.993) is 
now positive and significant.  Compared to the estimates for first round designation, this 
model explains less of the variance (pseudo R
2 = 0.298 versus 0.449 and log likelihood 
= -1078.0 versus –1118.9).  In addition, the coefficient on population density (-0.037) 
changed signs from the estimates of first round designation and is now negative and 
significant. 
The model estimating the probability of EZ designation in the third round is an even 
poorer fit of the data (pseudo R
2 = 0.293 and log likelihood = -601.4).  None of the 
coefficients on housing market indicators are significant at the 0.1 level, nor are the 
coefficients on population or unemployment rate.  As was the case with the Round 2 
estimation (but not for the first round), the coefficient on the population density variable 
(-0.047) is negative and significant.  
The same general pattern emerged from the multivariate regression results as from 
the univariate descriptive statistics.  Census tracts that were more distressed based on 
the population and housing characteristics were more likely to be designated as an 
Empowerment Zone.  Further, the tracts designated in the first round were more 
distressed in 1990 than tracts designated in subsequent rounds.  By the third round of 
designation, none of the housing market measures had any significant impact on zone 
destination. 
 
European Union Objective 2 Area regression results 
Table 7a and Table 7b present the result of estimating Equations 1 and 2 for the EU 
for the smaller subset of countries with programs in all three periods and the set of all 
countries for the second two periods.  The “All Ob. 2” column in Table 7a contains the 
probit estimation of Equation 1, the probability of Objective 2 (Ob.2) designation in any 
of the three rounds for the 483 NUTS_3 regions.  All of the coefficients are significant 
at the 0.1 level.  Consistent with the descriptive statistics, NUTS_3 areas with greater 
populations, lower population densities, and higher unemployment rates were more 




estimating Equation 2 for each of the three rounds.  As was the case with the US EZ 
designation regressions, the Round 1 estimation had the best fit.  In both rounds one and 
two, the coefficient on the unemployment rate (and constant) was the only coefficient 
significantly different than zero at the 0.1 level.  For Round 3, the population and 
population density variables were also significant at all reasonable significance levels. 
Table 7b presents the similar analysis for all 12 Ob.2 countries for the second two 
rounds of the program.  The first, “All Ob. 2,” column contains the probit estimation of 
the probability of Ob.2 designation in either the second or third round.  Using all of the 
countries, the sample size has increased from 483 to 619 observations, but coefficient 
estimates show exactly the same patterns as with the smaller subset of countries for all 
three rounds.  The final two columns of the table present the results of estimating 
Equation 2 for rounds 2 and 3.  Again, the fit of the regression is better for the earlier 
round. 
 
Italian Objective 2 Area regression results 
Similar to the previous analysis, Table 8 illustrates the results of the probit 
regressions for Italy sorted into the three designation rounds and the probability of 
designation in any of the three rounds.  Due to the small size of the geographic units 
(and consequently the large number of observations), most of the coefficient estimates 
are significant even if the overall fit of the model is modest as indicated by a pseudo R
2 
lower or equal to 0.06 for all 4 specifications reported in Table 8.   
The poor fit of the model may be largely explained by considering that, unlike with 
the US EZ program, the unit of analysis differs from the spatial units used to designate 
the target areas.  Characteristics are measured at the city/town level, while the regional 
focus of the programs leads to larger areas being targeted with incentives.  In Italy and 
the other EU member nations, Ob.2 areas are designated as contiguous groups of city 
and town jurisdictions forming local economies with prevailing conditions of declining 
industrial production.  Such designation processes, however, do not always exclude city 
or town jurisdictions with better off social or economic conditions that are surrounded 
by distressed communities.  As a result, Italy’s city/town-level (i.e., NUTS_5) data tend 
to contain much more variation within Ob.2 areas than do the US EZ areas, in which 
smaller geographic units (census tracts) are specifically singled out and more 




As for the coefficient estimates of the variables included in the model, the 
unemployment rate and the 1981-91 ten-year job growth are stable predictors of Ob.2 
designation from Round 1 to Round 3.  Both coefficients have the expected sign in all 
three designation rounds—positive for the unemployment rate and negative for the 10-
year job growth.  Regression results for the probability of designation in any of the three 
rounds indicate that NUTS_5 areas with lower population density and percentage of 
manufacturing employees, higher percentage of vacant houses and greater percentage of 
university graduates were more likely to be pat of Ob.2 areas.  For the estimates of the 
probability of being part of Ob.2 areas in the first designation round, most of the 
coefficients are still significant and of the same sign as in the “All Ob. 2“ equation.  The 
only exceptions are the coefficients on the percentage of manufacturing employees (P-
value = 0.199) and the percentage of vacant houses (P-value = 0.360) that are no longer 
significant at the 0.1 level.  Round 2 estimates show differences compared to those of 
the Round 1 equation only for the coefficients of population density (which is no longer 
significant at the 0.1 level) and percentage of manufacturing employees (which instead 
becomes statistically significant).  Round 3 estimates resemble the most those of the 
“All Ob. 2” equation, the only exception being the coefficient of the percentage of 
university graduates, which is no longer significant at the 0.1 level.  Although none of 
the models fit the data well, the Round 3 equation explains the most variation with a 
pseudo R
2 of 0.06 and a log likelihood of –2165.14. 
 
V.  Concluding remarks  
While the spatially targeted economic development programs administered at the 
national and supranational levels in the US and the EU have different stated goals, there 
are many similarities in the programs that make it worthwhile to examine the programs 
together.  On both continents, beyond any economic or ideological arguments for 
targeting investment incentives, part of the impetus for rationing the incentives 
geographically represented an effort to economize on scarce resources. 
The goal of the US Urban EZ program has been to combine economic development 
incentives with community development initiatives.  Therefore, the programs have 
required a great deal of community-level planning and participation at the proposal 
stage, and the programs were placed in the most distressed portions of the nation’s 




allow for the economic integration of distressed regions.  As such, the program is a 
much more regional approach than the US program. 
Lehman (1994) warned of two potential traps with national programs that 
geographically target incentives.  The first is that the program may be altered (diluted) 
so that it is implemented in a large enough political jurisdictions to gain political 
approval.  In such a case, the programs may become so diluted as to be ineffective.  The 
second trap is one in which the program is not diluted, but it still spread to many 
different political districts.  Here, the problem is that the program becomes very 
expensive as better-off places are also targeted by incentives that cannot be theoretically 
justified.   
In the programs examined in this paper, there is evidence that the programs have 
fallen into both traps.  In the US, the programs display evidence of dilution.  While 
more justifiable as a program to target impoverished urban areas, the programs were 
also extended to rural areas from the start.  In addition, the selection process appears to 
have been very political (Paige, 1999), and the Urban and Rural Empowerment Zone 
program has been expanded in three rounds to include Urban and Rural Enterprise 
Communities, Supplemental Enterprise Zones, Enhanced Empowerment Communities, 
Strategic Planning Communities, and Renewal Communities.  In addition to greatly 
increasing the geographic coverage of the programs over time, the incentives have 
become less generous, as the block grant money was eliminated for the later rounds of 
the Empowerment Zone programs.   
The US EZ program also shows evidence of falling into the second trap.  After the 
first round, the minimal distress criteria were relaxed to allow more census tracts to 
qualify for the program.  Further, the empirical examination of the places designated as 
EZs in this paper shows that the program was indeed more finely targeted at more 
distressed census tracts initially, and less distressed places were targeted in the latter 
rounds.  The probit regression model did a much better job of predicting which tracts 
would be targeted in the first round than in Round 2 or Round 3. 
The European Union’s structural programs have also fallen into both traps.  While 
reforms refocused the programs in 1989, by the second round there existed four 
different objectives spatially targeting different places for special incentives.  Round 3 
simplified the number of programs but did not reduce the geographic scope of the 




The Ob. 2 programs in particular have fallen into the second trap.  In contrast to the 
Urban EZ program that excludes better-off parts of urban areas, the regional 
implementation of the Ob. 2 programs necessitates that the programs also target some 
well-off portions of declining regions.  The empirical results of the previous section are 
consistent with these observations.  In the EU as a whole, the probit model had the best 
fit for the first Ob. 2 round, and the descriptive statistics at the NUTS_3 level indicated 
that provinces with the highest unemployment rates were targeted in the earlier rounds.  
However, when the same type of analysis was performed at a finer geographic level, 
NUTS_5, for Italian cities and towns, it became much more difficult to distinguish the 
treated from untreated areas.  The models for Italy had very little predictive power.  
Thus, while the programs do appear to target distressed regions, the broad brush also 
places cities doing well within those regions. 
While it appears that federal spatially targeted programs are falling into the political 
traps of expansion to less well-targeted areas over time in the US and the EU, it is 
important for future research to take the next step and evaluate how program outcomes 
differ based on the initial characteristics of the areas targeted.
16  Expansion is only a trap 
if program effectiveness suffers as a consequence.  The results of such impact 
evaluation will be particularly useful as the EU formulates policy to aid the economic 
integration of new countries during its current round of expansion.  
 
  
                                                 
16  In one study, Engberg and Greenbaum (1999) found some differential impacts of US 






Table 1.  U.S. Urban Empowerment Zone Programs 
 
Round 1 (1994)  Round 2 (1998)  Round 3 (2001) 
Atlanta, GA
a  Boston, MA  Fresno, CA 
Baltimore, MD  Cincinnati, OH  Jacksonville, FL 
Chicago, IL  Columbia/Sumter, SC  Oklahoma City, OK 
Cleveland, OH
b  Columbus, OH  Pulaski County, AR 
Detroit, MI  Cumberland County, NJ  San Antonio, TX 
Los Angeles, CA
b  El Paso, TX  Syracuse, NY 
New York, NY  Gary/East Chicago, IN  Tucson, AZ 
Philadelphia, PA/Camden, NJ  Ironton, OH/Huntington, WV  Yonkers, NY 
 Knoxville,  TN   
  Miami/Dade County, FL   
 Minneapolis,  MN   
  New Haven, CT   
 Norfolk/Portsmouth,  VA   
  Santa Ana, CA   
  St. Louis, MO/East St. Louis, IL  
 
Notes:  Dates of zone designation in parentheses.  
           
a  Converted into a Renewal Community in Round 3.  
       




Table 2.  EU Objective 2 Areas at the NUTS_1 Level 
 








Austria       
Ostösterreich   X  X 
Südösterreich   X  X 
Westösterreich   X  X 
Belgium        
Région Bruxelles Capitale      X 
Vlaams  Gewest  X X X 
Région  Wallonne  X X X 
Germany        
Baden-Württemberg     X 
Bayern   X  X 
Berlin  X X X 
Bremen  X X X 
Hamburg     X 
Hessen   X  X 
Niedersachsen  X X X 
Nordrhein-Westfalen  X X X 
Rheinland-Pfalz  X X X 
Saarland  X X X 
Schleswig-Holstein   X  X 
Denmark        
Denmark  X X X 
Spain        
Noroeste X       
Noreste  X X X 
Comunidad De Madrid  X  X  X 
Este  X X X 
Finland       
Åland     X 
Manner-Suomi   X  X 
France       
Île De France      X 
Bassin  Parisien  X X X 
Nord - Pas-De-Calais  X  X  X 
Est  X X X 
Ouest  X X X 
Sud-Ouest  X X X 
Centre-Est  X X X 




Table 2.  EU Objective 2 Areas at the NUTS_1 Level, Continued 
 








Italy       
Nord Ovest  X  X  X 
Lombardia X  X  X 
Nord Est  X  X  X 
Emilia-Romagna   X  X 
Centro X  X  X 
Lazio X  X  X 
Abruzzo-Molise     X 
Luxembourg       
Luxembourg (Grand-Duché)  X  X  X 
Netherlands       
Noord-Nederland X  X  X 
Oost-Nederland X  X  X 
West-Nederland     X 
Zuid-Nederland X  X  X 
Sweden       
Sverige   X  X 
United Kingdom       
North East  X  X  X 
North West  X  X  X 
Yorkshire And The Humber  X  X  X 
East Midlands  X  X  X 
West Midlands  X  X  X 
East Of England    X  X 
London   X  X 
South East    X  X 
South West    X  X 
Wales X  X  X 
Scotland X  X  X 
 
Note:  “X” represents presence of an Objective 2 area in the NUTS_1 regions during the 




Table 3.  Characteristics of US Urban Census Tracts in 1990 
by Empowerment Zone Status 
 
     EZ 
1990 Census Variables  No EZ
a  EZ
a  Round 1  Round 2














































































































































Number of tracts  43291  721  348  249  124 
 
Notes:  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
  
a  Tests of the equality of EZ and non-EZ means are all rejected at the 0.0001 level. 
  
b Tests of the equality of the means from Round 1:   
 




Table 4a. Characteristics of EU NUTS_3 Areas in 1990 
by Objective 2 Status 
Excluding Austria, Finland, Sweden, and England 
 
     Objective  2 
Variables  Non Ob. 2
  Ob. 2
a  Round 1  Round 2













































Number of observations  279  204  63  95  190 
 
Notes:  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
a  Tests of the equality of Ob. 2 and non-Ob. 2 means. 
b Tests of the equality of the means from Round 1.  
* P-value≤0.1 ** P-value≤0.05 *** P-value ≤0.01 
 
 
Table 4b. Characteristics of EU NUTS_3 Areas in 1995 
by Objective 2 Status 
Including all Countries 
 
     Objective  2 
Variables  Non Ob. 2
  Ob. 2
a  Round 2




































Number of observations  329  290  157  275 
 
  Notes:  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
  
a  Tests of the equality of Ob. 2 and non-Ob. 2 means. 
  
b Tests of the equality of the means from Round 1:   
 




Table 5. Characteristics of Italy NUTS_5 Areas in 1991 
by Objective 2 Status 
 
     Objective  2 
Variables  Non Ob. 2
  Ob. 2
a  Round 1  Round 2

































































































Number of observations  3858  1492  576  675  827 
 
Notes:  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
a  Tests of the equality of Ob. 2 and non-Ob. 2 means. 
b Tests of the equality of the means from Round 1.  




Table 6. Probability of US Empowerment Zone Designation: 
Probit Regressions 
 





















































































































2   0.404  0.449  0.298  0.293 
Log likelihood   -2192.531  -1118.870  -1078.003  -601.350 
Number of observations   44012  44012  43664  43415 
                   
Notes:  P-values are in parentheses. 
  Coefficients in bold are significant at the 0.1 significance level. 
a Variables measured in thousands. 




Table 7a.  Probability of EU Objective 2 Designation: 
Probit Regressions Excluding Austria, Finland, Sweden, and England 
 













































2   0.310  0.328  0.268  0.269 
Log likelihood   -227.151  -125.741  -175.303  -236.755 
Number of observations   483  483  483  483 
 
        Notes:  P-values are in parentheses. 
        Coefficients in bold are significant at the 0.1 significance level. 
          
a Variable measured in hundreds of thousands. 
                    
b Variable measured in hundreds. 
          
c Variable measured in hundredths.  
 
Table 7b.  Probability of EU Objective 2 Designation: 
Probit Regressions Including all Countries 
 





































2   0.175  0.238  0.155 
Log likelihood   -352.899  -267.114  -359.229 
Number of observations   619  619  619 
         
        Notes:  P-values are in parentheses. 
        Coefficients in bold are significant at the 0.1 significance level. 
          
a Variable measured in hundreds of thousands. 
                    
b Variable measured in hundreds. 
        




Table 8. Probability of Objective 2 Designation in Italy: 
Probit Regressions 
 




-0.0003   
(0.000) 
-0.0002    
(0.007) 
-0.00003    
 (0.567) 





0.056      
(0.000) 













0.005    
(0.000) 
-0.008    
(0.000) 
% Ten-year job growth
b (1981-
91) 
-0.968      
(0.000)  






















0.039    
(0.000)      
0.053
 
(0.000)       
0.063    
(0.000)    
0.010 
(0.259)        
Constant 
 
-0.960      
(0.000) 
-1.814   
(0.000) 





2   0.047  0.028  0.028  0.060 
Log likelihood   -3018.712    -1776.656     -1970.815     -2165.139     
Number of observations   5350  5350  5350  5350 
 
Notes:  P-values are in parentheses 
a Variable in thousands. 
b Percentage variables in hundredths.  





Table 9.  Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition  Source 
US    
Population Population  Decennial  Census
a 
Population density  People per square km  Decennial Census
a 
% Unemployment  Unemployment rate  Decennial Census
a 
% Poverty  Poverty rate  Decennial Census
a 
Median household income  Median household income  Decennial Census
a 
% Minority  Percentage minority  Decennial Census
a 




Median rent  Median rent  Decennial Census
a 
Median house value  Median house value  Decennial Census
a 




EU    
Population Population  Eurostat
b 
Population density  People per square km  Eurostat
b 
% Unemployment   Unemployment rate  Eurostat
b 
ITALY    
Population density  People per square km  ISTAT
 c 
Unemployment rate 
  Unemployment rate  Geostat
d 





% Ten-year job growth (1981-
91) 
Percent change in total jobs 
between 1981 and 1991 
Geostat
d 
% Vacant houses 
Percentage vacant houses  Censimento 
popolazione
c 








a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; Office of Policy Development 
and Research (Vol. 2) 
b European Commission (2001) 
c Istituto Tagliacarne (1990) 
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